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New England Journal of Public Policy

Editor’s Note
Padraig O’Malley
University of Massachusetts Boston, padraig.omalley@umb.edu

The twenty-first century’s opening decades have witnessed the slow erosion of the rules-based
order put in place after the Second World War. We live in a world beset with challenges and
institutions that should rise to these challenges but are unable to do so.
The Great Recession of the first decade of the century undermined trust in the economic order;
at the end of the second decade, the COVID-19 pandemic with global lockdowns upended and
changed the world as we knew it; the post-COVID reorientation of economies adjusting to
deglobalization disrupted supply chains, and labor shortages have unleashed rampant inflation, at
levels not seen since the 1970s. Rising interests are playing havoc with the markets, and in the
early years of the third decade, the war in the Ukraine threatens to escalate into a wider conflict. It
has resulted in massive increases in energy costs in Europe, with secondary effects to its economies
and political order.
The war has reached a stage where the prospect of a tactical nuclear strike by Russia targeting
Ukraine is no longer unthinkable. It has entered the realm of the possible, not yet likely, but
increasingly part of the conversation as Russia continues to lose ground to a smaller but much
superior Ukraine, armed with sophisticated military hardware supplied by the United States. With
every military setback, Vladimir Putin raises the stakes and the West responds by sending Ukraine
ever more sophisticated weapons. This escalatory trajectory can only end badly.
Throw in a China making increasingly threatening noise about Taiwan, and a leader, Xi
Jinping, convinced that the United States is in decline, who wants to Make China Great Again. On
the geopolitical margins, Kim Jong-un, trying to reassert North Korea’s prominence on the global
stage, is back to testing intercontinental ballistic missiles. A slow drift to authoritarian rule is
enveloping floundering democracies, including the United States. Climate warming is savaging
countries with temperatures in some parts slowly reaching the unlivable. Drought and famine are
ravaging huge swaths of the Middle East, China, and Africa; forest fires across the US west and
parts of Europe are scorching the earth; flooding in Pakistan swamped a third of the country in
what was described as a “monsoon on steroids”; and Hurricane Ian flattened Puerto Rico and
thrashed parts of the west coast of Florida with catastrophic storm surges.
The EU countries are undergoing their own reckoning. The need to redefine their security
needs and build their defenses as a bulwark against Russian aggression that can no longer be
discounted has shifted some power to countries on the eastern periphery, such as Poland and the
Baltic states. The Poles in particular see Russia as an enemy, but many Poles also see Germany as
the “Other,” calling on Germany to pay €1.3 trillion in reparations for its 1939–1945 occupation.1
Germany remains the economic powerhouse but is wrestling with reorienting its energy sector in
an effort to terminate its dependence on Russian oil. Trying to ward off a deep recession has led
some of the richer countries to take measures that tend to undermine the integrity of the Single
Market.
Padraig O’Malley is the John Joseph Moakley Professor of Peace and Reconciliation at the John W. McCormack
Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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The semi-authoritarian regimes in Poland and Hungary, the right-wing government in Italy lead
by the far-right Giorgia Meloni, the stunning rise of the Sweden Democrats, rising support for
Marie Le Pen in France, and Vox in Spain moving from the periphery into the mainstream don’t
augur well either for the European Union’s democratic credentials or its ability to hold together
when the winter cold tests its resolve to maintain solidarity of support for Ukraine. On all fronts
there are fissures in the consensus.
The US midterm elections in November are predicted to give Republicans control of the
House of Representatives. Dozens of Republican candidates are running on platforms embracing
the Big Lie—that Donald Trump won the 2020 presidential election. Investigations into all things
Democratic are promised. Expect proceedings to impeach President Joe Biden. Tit for tat, as the
country racks itself on polarization and its democracy under threats last seen during the Civil War.
The articles in this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy reflect aspects of the
changing world order as it continues to adjust to the digital age.
In “Complex Adaptive Systems in a Contentious World,” Yasmin Merali draws on the
Complex Adaptive Systems paradigm “to explore how world order emerges from the dynamics of
network relationships between the players in the cyber-social landscape.” She elaborates on
“mechanisms underpinning resilience, adaptation, and transformation of socioeconomic systems
in turbulent contexts,” emphasizing “a need to reconsider conventional logics and mindsets.”
“World leaders,” she writes, “need to choose whether to persist in defending the international rulebased order or to embrace network thinking and create conditions under which each country can
find a sustainable niche in a global ecosystem.” In “Bounded Confidence: How AI Could
Exacerbate Social Media’s Homophily Problem,” Dylan Weber, Scott Atran, and Rich Davis
interrogate one of the drivers of polarization, examining how the Internet is impacting the
functioning of democracies. Heralded at the time of its advent “as a revolutionary development in
the democratization of information,” online conversations on social media have tended to “narrow
the information landscape of its users.” “This dynamic,” they write, “is driven by the propensity
of the network structure of social media to tend toward homophily; users strongly prefer to interact
with content and other users that are similar to them.” Kumar Ramakrishna’s “Enter the Age of
Csywar: Some Reflections on an Emergent Trend” discusses the changing nature of warfare in the
digital age, the emergence of what he terms “csywar”—“an indirect, hybrid strategy” on the part
of intervening states that “seeks to attain data, infrastructural, and epistemic dominance over the
target state.” He weighs the merits of “various defensive counter-csywar strategies that target states
could pursue” and makes the case for “developing deterrent counter-csywar capabilities against
hostile intervening states.”
Two articles, Mike Hardy’s “Responding to Turbulent Times: Where Does Leadership Come
In?” and Michael D. Buhrmester, Michael A. Cowan, and Harvey Whitehouse’s “What Motivates
Barrier-Crossing Leadership?” examine where and what constitutes leadership in the twenty-first
century where the challenges are complex, interconnected, and existential. Hardy observes that
“the success of leadership responses to challenges of violent conflict and health pandemics as well
as the extent to which we see futures through fragmented or solidarity lenses has created real
interest in global perspectives in leadership and a new research agenda that is associated with this
imperative.” The article concludes by “identifying work in progress, by assessing the universality
of characteristics that have been associated with good leadership and how globalization is changing
leaders’ perspectives and required competencies.” Buhrmester, Cowan, and Whitehouse report on
a different question. Their article presents the results of surveys in seven communities, contrasting
barrier-crossing leaders (“who pursue group interests by recognizing rivals’ interests and working
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with them to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes”) with barrier-bound leaders (“who champion
their group’s goals against those of rivals from seven communities”). “In line with new theories
from group psychology and anthropology,” they found that “barrier-crossers uniquely reported
intense, family-like bonds to both ingroups and outgroups,” and that “these outgroup bonds result
from past, personally transformative experiences shared with outgroup members.”
In “The Youth Inferno: Two-Way Working on Ancestral Lands,” Pamela Nathan presents
some of the work of Creating a Safe and Supportive Environment (CASSE) in Central Australia,
Northern Territory, with the youth in the justice system. In “the monster world of trauma, for the
youth who are its casualties,” she writes “CASSE has endeavored to contain the ‘too much’ and to
fill the ‘too little’ with stories and hope.” “In two-way working,” she adds, “CASSE seeks to
replace fear with hope and deadness with aliveness, transforming extraordinary, catastrophic
darkness to light the ordinary with companionship, compassion, resilience, and reflection.” She
concludes: “Over ten years, CASSE has become a trusted organization. Aboriginal people now
recognize CASSE as a trusted container that can hold the good and the bad, bear the pain and
deposit trust in the Other and catalyze change. In a landscape of trauma, the psychoanalytic frame
has been fundamental to enabling the work to endure and to empower.”
The Northern Ireland peace process is the focus of three articles. In “Managing the
Atmosphere: Intelligence and Assessment in the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Peace
Process—An Interview with Sir John Chilcot,” Graham Spencer asserts that Chilcot, a Northern
Ireland Office official, was “central to the development of the peace process.” Spencer details the
challenges Chilcot faced “in assessing intelligence across a range of sources and collating that
intelligence in ways to best serve the strategic objective of achieving peace.” The interview, he
says, “provides important information about the British government’s role in the early stages of
the peace process, when sensitivities and risks were high, and it details the significance of building
foundations that were consistent with key principles interpreted and applied through a pragmatic
and imaginative assessment of intelligence.”
Coming up to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, Northern
Ireland remains an unsettled place. Since Brexit, the word most associated with the peace process
is “fragile.” When young loyalists rioted at the Lanark interface separating Catholics on the
Springfield Road from Protestants in the Shankill in April 2021 to protest the Northern Ireland
Protocol—the sea border in the Irish sea that requires checks on goods coming into Northern
Ireland from Great Britain as part of the post-Brexit arrangement that keeps Northern Ireland in
the European Union’s Single Market and ensures seamless trade between Northern Ireland and the
Republic, a member country—Irish prime minister Michael Martin, then British prime minister
Boris Johnson, EU Commission president Ursula Van Leyden, and US president Joe Biden warned
that the keeping the peace was paramount, that the Good Friday Agreement offered the best
safeguards, and that the peace was fragile, what Brendan O Leary and other scholars call a “dirty
peace.” The Agreement ended the horrific violence of thirty years, but despite hundreds of millions
of dollars being poured into reconciliation projects, the reconciliation between the two
communities, nationalist/republican and loyalist/unionist or Catholic nationalist/Protestant
unionist has been slow and sporadic. Republican and loyalist paramilitaries remain in the shadows.
For as long as paramilitarism remains “a clear and present danger,” to quote successive reports
of the Independent Reporting Commission (IRC), a monitoring organization created under the
2015 Fresh Start Agreement, there will always be some set of circumstances that will breathe fire
into the ashes of their violent pasts. Some paramilitaries justify their continued existence as having
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become key figures in the conflict transformation phase of the peace process, as they manage the
tensions at the interfaces between their respective communities.
Unless the steps the IRC outlines in great detail—especially massive measures to address the
scale of deprivation in both communities—are implemented, and the paramilitary presence and
their dissident counterparts in republican and loyalist communities permanently eradicated, the
IRC will continue to wail “a clear and present danger” in their reports, and tentacles of
paramilitarism will continue to exert their vice-like grip in these communities. In March 2022, the
“terror threat level” was downgraded from “severe” to substantial in the North for the first time in
twelve years.2 Days later, because of a bomb scare, Irish foreign minister Simon Coveney was
evacuated from the Houben Centre in Belfast, where he was attending a peace dialogue. And
almost immediately the Ulster Volunteer Force issued its own threat.3
Adrian Guelke has written that “in a deeply divided society conflict exists along a wellentrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic and that contains the potential for violence
between the segments.”4 That fault line in Northern Ireland is still a yawning geopolitical gap
between two sets of competing perspectives on the present and the future. In a divided society
saturated with binary choices, every decision, from the trivial to the existential, receives the same
zero-sum stamp.
Going on a full generation after the conflict, on the way to a milestone where the Good Friday
Agreement peace has more years behind it than the decades of conflict, that potential for violence
still exists and is invoked very effectively by one side or another when it perceives a threat to its
interests. “Is a return to violence on the cards?” the Financial Times asked after reviewing what
the political endgames might be following the May 2022 Assembly elections. And it answered its
own question: “No one expects a full-scale return to the Troubles, but there have been worrying
flashbacks—a van hijacking/car hoax last month, and petrol bombs hurled at police this week.”5
Small-scale stuff but sufficient to push the alert button.6
In two articles, “Cultural Work in Peacebuilding among Traumatized Communities of
Northern Ireland 1: Background and General Considerations,” and “Cultural Work in
Peacebuilding among Traumatized Communities of Northern Ireland 2: Talking about Culture,”
Eugen Koh argues that the peace remains fragile because “many aspects of the sectarian conflict
have been embedded in cultural substrata of the respective communities.” Accordingly, “cultural
transformation is necessary to achieve comprehensive and sustained peace.” History casts a long
and unforgiving grip. Assumptions about the Other “have their origin in traumatic events that
occurred more than three hundred years ago.” The detritus of these events has been “reinforced by
the more recent three decades of conflict.” As a result, “these traumatic individual and collective
experiences across the generations have had a profound effect on the culture and peace processes
within Northern Ireland.” Koh offers “a psychodynamically informed understanding of the
sectarian conflict” and “‘culture work’ as a means to cultural transformation.”
The first article “discusses general contextual issues,” the psychoanalytic concepts that inform
his history of Northern Ireland from a “psychodynamic perspective,” most notably from the early
seventeenth century through the twenty-first, and presents a “framework for considering culture
and a process of transformation.” The second describes an ongoing project, “Talking about
Culture,” a pilot project involving community leaders from both sides of the sectarian divide and
some who are nonaligned in what he terms “a psychodynamic trauma–informed approach to
cultural conversations involving an in-depth analysis of culture that avoids becoming stuck.” He
concludes with outlining “a framework and set of preconditions that enable such deep
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conversations” and some of the necessary conditions that may enable such work to take place and
identifying some “key features and processes involved.”
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